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I11 
T H E  PLACE OF ART IN T H E  SPIRIT AND 
IN HUMAN SOCIETY 
HE dispute as to the dependence o r  independence of T art was at  its hottest in the romantic period, when the 
motto of “art  fo r  art’s sake” was coined, and as its apparent 
antithesis that other of “art for  life”; and from that time 
it was discussed, to tell the truth, rather among men of let- 
ters o r  artists than philosophers. I t  has lost interest in 
our day, fallen to the rank of a theme with which begin- 
ners amuse o r  exercise themselves, or  of an argument for  
academic orations. However, even previous to the romantic 
period, and indeed in the most ancient documents containing 
reflections upon art, are to be found traces of i t ;  and philos- 
ophers of IEsthetic themselves, even when they appear to 
neglect it (and they do indeed neglect it in its vulgar form) ,  
really do consider it, and indeed may be said to think of noth- 
ing else. Because, to dispute as to the dependence or  the 
independence, the autonomy or  the heteronomy of art  does 
not mean anything but to enquire whether art is or is not, 
and, if it is, what it is. An activity whose principle depends 
upon that of another activity is, effectively, that other ac- 
tivity, and retains for itself an existence that is only putative 
or  conventional: ar t  which depends upon morality, upon 
pleasure, or  upon philosophy is morality, pleasure, or  phi- 
losophy; it is not art. If it be held not to be dependent, it 
will be advisable to investigate the foundation of its inde- 
pendence-that is to say, how art  is distinguished from 
morality, from pleasure, from philosophy, and from all 
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other things; what it is-and to posit whatever it niay be as 
truly autonomous and independent. I t  may chance to be 
asserted, on the other hand, by those very people who affirm 
the concept of the original nature of art, that although it 
preserve its peculiar nature, yet its place is below another 
activity of superior dignity, and (as used at  one time to be 
said) that it is a handmaid to  ethic, a minister to politics, and 
a dragoman to science ; but this would only prove that there 
are people who have the habit of contradicting themselves 
o r  of allowing discord among their thoughts: dazed folk 
whose existence truly does not call for  any sort of proof. For  
our part, we shall take care not to fall into so dazed a condi- 
tion ; and having already made clear that ar t  is distinguished 
from the physical world and from the practical, moral, and 
conceptual activity as intuition, we shall give ourselves no 
further anxiety, and shall assume that with that first dem- 
onstration we have also demonstrated the independence of 
art. 
But another problem is implicit in the dispute as to 
dependence or independence; of this I have hitherto pur- 
posely not spoken, and I shall now proceed to examine it. 
Independence is a concept of relation, and in this aspect the 
only absolute independence is the Absolute, or absolute rela- 
tion; every particular form and concept is independent on 
one side and dependent on another, o r  both independent and 
dependent. Were this not so, the spirit, and reality in gen- 
eral, would be either a series of juxtaposed absolutes, o r  
(which amounts to  the same thing) a series of juxtaposed 
nullities. T h e  independence of a form implies the matter to 
which it is applied, as we have already seen in the develop- 
ment of the genesis of art  as an intuitive formation of a sen- 
timental or passionate material; and in the case of absolute 
independence, since all material and aliment would be want- 
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ing to it, form itself, being void, would become nullified. But 
since the recognised independence prevents our thinking one 
activity as submitted to the principle of another, the de- 
pendence must be such as to  guarantee the independence. 
But this would not be guaranteed in the hypothesis that one 
activity should be made to  depend upon another, in the 
same way as that other upon it, like two forces which 
counterbalance each other, and of which the one does not 
conquer the other;  because, i f  it do not conquer it, we have 
reciprocal arrest and static; if it conquer the other, pure and 
simple dependence, which has already been excluded. Hence, 
considering the matter in general, it appears that there is no 
other way of thinking the simultaneous independence and 
dependence of the various spiritual activities than that of 
conceiving them in the relation of condition and condi- 
tioned, in which the conditioned surpasses the condition 
and presupposes it, and, becoming again in its turn condition, 
gives rise to a new conditioned, thus constituting a series of 
developments. No other defect could be attributed to this 
series than that the first of the series would be a condition 
without a previous conditioned, and the last conditioned 
which would not become in its turn condition, thus causing a 
double rupture of the law of development itself. Even this 
defect is healed i f  the last be made the condition of the first 
and the first the condition of the last; that is to say, if the 
series be conceived as reciprocal action, or, better (and aban- 
doning all naturalistic phraseology), as a circle. This  con- 
ception seems to  be the only way out of the difficulties with 
which the other conceptions of the spiritual life are striving, 
both that which makes it consist of an assemblage of 
independent and unrelated faculties of the soul, o r  of inde- 
pendent and unrelated ideas of  value, and that which sub- 
ordinates all these in one and resolves them in that one, 
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which remains immobile and impotent; or, more subtly, con- 
ceives them as necessary grades of a linear development 
which leads from an irrational first to  a last that would wish 
to be most rational, but is, however, superrational, and as 
such also irrational. 
But it will be opportune not to insist upon this somewhat 
abstract scheme, and rather consider the manner in which it 
becomes actual in the life of the spirit, beginning with the 
zesthetic spirit. Fo r  this purpose we shall again return to 
the artist, o r  man-artist, who has achieved the process of 
liberation from the sentimental tumult and has objectified it 
in a lyrical image-that is, has attained to art. H e  finds 
his satisfaction in this image, because he has worked and 
moved in this direction : all know more or  less the joy of the 
complete expression which we succeed in giving to our own 
psychical impulses, and the joy in those of others, which are 
also ours, when we contemplate the works of others, which 
are to some extent ours, and which we make ours. But is the 
satisfaction definite? Was  only the man-artist impelled 
toward the image? Toward the image and toward another 
at the same time; toward the image in so far  as he is man- 
artist, toward another in so f a r  as he is artist-man; toward 
the image on the first plane, but, since the first plane is con- 
nected with the second and third planes, also toward the sec- 
ond and third, although immediately toward the first and 
mediately toward the second and third? And now that he has 
reached the first plane, the second appears immediately be- 
hind it, and becomes a direct aim from indirect that it was 
before; and a new demand declares itself, a new process 
begins. Not ,  be it well observed, that the intuitive power 
gives place to another power, as though taking its turn of 
pleasure or  of service; but the intuitive power itself-or, 
better, the spirit itself, which at first seemed to be, and in a 
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certain sense was, all intuition-develops in itself the new 
process, which comes forth from the vitals of the first. “One 
soul is not kindled at another” in us ( I  shall avail myself 
again on this occasion of Dante’s words),  but the one soul, 
which first is all collected in one single “virtue,” and which 
seems to obey no longer any power,” satisfied in that virtue 
alone (in the artistic image), finds in that virtue, together 
with its satisfaction, its dissatisfaction: its satisfaction, be- 
cause it gives to the soul all that it can give and is expected 
from i t ;  its dissatisfaction, because, having obtained all that, 
and having satiated the soul with its ultimate sweetness,- 
“what is asked and thanked for,”-satisfaction is sought for 
the new need caused by the first satisfaction, which was not 
able to arise without that first satisfaction. And we all know 
also, from continual experience, the new want which lurks be- 
hind the formation of images. Ugo Foscolo has a love-aff air 
with the Countess Arese; he knows with what sort of love 
and with what sort of woman he has to do, as can be proved 
from the letters he wrote, which are to be read in print. 
Nevertheless, during the moments that he loves her, that 
woman is his universe, and he aspires to possess her as the 
highest beatitude, and in the enthusiasm of his admiration 
would render the mortal woman immortal, would transfig- 
ure this earthly creature into one divine for  the time to come, 
achieving for her a new miracle of love. And indeed he 
already finds her rapt to the empyrean, an object of worship 
and of prayers : 
6 4  
And thou, divine one, living in my hymns, 
Shalt receive the vows  of my Insubrian descendants. 
T h e  ode All’ amica risanata would not have taken shape in 
the spirit of Foscolo unless this metamorphosis of love had 
been desired and longed for with the greatest seriousness 
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(lovers and even philosophers, i f  they have been in love, 
can witness that these absurdities are seriously desired) ; 
and the images with which Foscolo represents the fasci- 
nation of his goddess-friend, so rich in perils, would not 
have presented themselves so vividly and so spontaneously 
as they did. But what was that impetus of the soul which 
has now become a magnificent lyrical representation? W a s  
all of Foscolo, the soldier, the patriot, the man of learn- 
ing, moved with so many spiritual needs, expressed in that 
aspiration? Did it act so energetically within him as to  
be turned into action, and to  some extent to give direction to  
his practical life? Foscolo, who had not been wanting of in- 
sight in the course of his love, as regards his poetry also from 
time to  time became himself again when the creative tumult 
was appeased, and again acquired full clearness of vision. 
H e  asks himself what he really did will, and what the woman 
deserved. I t  may be that a slight suspicion of scepticism had 
insinuated itself during the formation of the image, if our 
ears be not deceived in seeming to  detect here and there in 
the ode some trace of elegant irony toward the woman, and 
of the poet toward himself. This would not have happened 
in the case of a more ingenuous spirit, and the poetry would 
have flowed forth quite ingenuously. Foscolo the poet, 
having achieved his task and therefore being no longer 
poet, now wishes to  know his real condition. H e  no longer 
forms the image, because he has formed i t ;  he no longer 
fancies, but perceives and narrates (“that woman,” he will 
say later of the “divine one,” “had a piece of brain instead 
of a heart”) ; and the lyrical image changes, for him and 
for us, into an autobiographical extract, or perception. 
With perception we have entered a new and very wide 
spiritual field: and, truly, words are not strong enough to  
satirise those thinkers who, now as in the past, confound 
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image and perception, making of the image a perception ( a  
portrait or  copy or  imitation of nature, or  history of the 
individual and of the times, etc.), and, worse still, of the 
perception a kind of image apprehensible by the “senses.” 
But perception is neither more nor less than a complete 
judgment, and as judgment implies an image and a cate- 
gory or  system of mental categories which must domi- 
nate the image (reality, quality, etc.) ; and in respect of 
the image, or  a priori esthetic synthesis of feeling and 
fancy (intuition), it is a new synthesis, of representation and 
category, of subject and predicate, the a priori logical syn- 
thesis, of which it would be fitting to repeat all that has been 
said of the other, and, above all, that in it content and form, 
representation and category, subject and predicate, do not 
appear as two elements united by a third, but the representa- 
tion appears as category, the category as representation, 
in indivisible unity: the subject is subject only in the predi- 
cate, and the predicate is predicate only in the subject. N o r  
is perception a logical act among other logical acts, o r  the 
most rudimentary and imperfect of them; for he who is able 
to extract from it all the treasures it contains would have no 
need to seek beyond it for other determinations of logicity, 
because consciousness of what has really happened, which in 
its eminently literary forms takes the name of history, and 
consciousness of the universal, which in its eminent forms 
takes the name of  system or  philosophy, spring from per- 
ception, which is itself this synthetic gemination : and philos- 
ophy and history constitute the superior unity, which phi- 
losophers have discovered, for no other reason than the syn- 
thetic connection of the perceptive judgment, whence they 
are born and in which they live, identifying philosophy 
and history, and which men of good sense discover in their 
own way, though they always observe that ideas suspended 
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in air are phantoms, are facts which occur-real facts-what 
alone is true, and alone worthy of being known. Finally, 
perception (the variety of perceptions) explains why the 
human intellect strives to emerge from them and to impose 
upon them a world of types and of laws, governed by mathe- 
matical measures and relations; which is the reason of the 
formation of the natural sciences and mathematics, in addi- 
tion to philosophy and history. 
I t  is not here my task to give a sketch of Logic, as I have 
been o r  am giving a sketch of Rsthet ic ;  and therefore, re- 
fraining from determining and developing the theory of 
Logic, and intellectual, perceptive, and historical knowledge, 
I shall resume the thread of the argument, not proceeding 
on this occasion from the artistic and intuitive spirit, but 
from the logical and historical, which has surpassed the 
intuitive and has elaborated the image in perception. Does 
the spirit find satisfaction in this form? Certainly: all 
know the very lively satisfactions of knowledge and sci- 
ence; all know, from experience, the desire which takes 
possession of one to  discover the countenance of reality, 
concealed by our illusions; and even though that counte- 
nance be terrible, the discovery is never unaccompanied with 
profound pleasure, due to  the satisfaction of possessing the 
truth. But does such satisfaction differ in being complete and 
final from that afforded by ar t?  Does not dissatisfaction 
perhaps appear side by side with the satisfaction of know- 
ing reality? This, too, is most certain; and the dissatisfac- 
tion of having known manifests itself (as  indeed all know by 
experience) in the desire for action: it is well to  know the 
real state of affairs, but we must know it in order to  act; by 
all means let us know the world, but in order that we may 
change it : tempus cognoscendi, tempus destruendi, tempus 
renovandi. No man remains stationary in knowledge, not 
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even sceptics o r  pessimists who, in consequence of that 
knowledge, assume this or that attitude, adopt this or that 
form of life. And that very fixing of acquired knowledge, 
that “retaining ” after “understanding,” without which (still 
quoting Dante) “there can be no science,” the formation of 
types and laws and criteria of measurement, the natural sci- 
ences and mathematics, to which I have just referred, were a 
surpassing of the act of theory by proceeding to the act of 
action. And not only does everyone know from experience, 
and can always verify by comparison with facts, that this is 
indeed so; but on consideration, it is evident that things 
could not proceed otherwise. There was a time (which still 
exists for not a few unconscious Platonicians, mystics, and 
ascetics) when it was believed that to know was to elevate 
the soul to a god, to  an Idea, to  a world of ideas, to  an 
Absolute placed above the phenomenal human world; and 
it was natural that when the soul, becoming estranged from 
itself by an effort against nature, had attained to  that 
superior sphere, it returned confounded to  earth, where 
it could remain perpetually happy and inactive. Tha t  
thought, which was no longer thought, had for counterpoise 
a reality that was not reality. But since (with Vico, Kant, 
Hegel, and other heresiarchs) knowledge has descended 
to earth, and is no longer conceived as a more or  less 
pallid copy of an immobile reality, but remains always 
human, and produces, not abstract ideas, but concrete con- 
cepts which are syllogisms and historical judgments, percep- 
tions of the real, the practical is no longer something that 
represents a degeneration of knowledge, a second fall from 
heaven to earth, o r  from paradise to hell, nor something 
that can be resolved upon o r  abstained from, but is implied 
in theory itself, as a demand of theory; and as the theory, 
so the practice. Our thought is historical thought of a his- 
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torical world, a process of development of a development; 
and hardly has a qualification of reality been pronounced, 
when the qualification is already of no value, because it has 
itself produced a new reality, which awaits a new qualifica- 
tion. A new reality, which is economic and moral life, 
turns the intellectual into the practical man, the politician, 
the saint, the man of business, the hero, and elaborates the 
a priori logical synthesis into the practical a priori synthesis; 
but this is nevertheless always a new feeling, a new desiring, 
a new willing, a new passionality, in which the spirit can 
never rest, and solicits above all as new material a new in- 
tuition, a new lyricism, a new art. 
And thus the last term of the series reunites itself (as I 
stated at  the beginning) with the first term, the circle is 
closed, and the passage begins again: a passage which is a 
return of that already made, whence the Vichian concept 
expressed in the word “return,” now become classic. But 
the development which I have described explains the inde- 
pendence of art, and also the reasons for  its apparent de- 
pendence, in the eyes of those who have conceived erroneous 
doctrines (hedonistic, moralistic, conceptualistic, etc.) , which 
I have criticised above, though noting, in the course of criti- 
cism, that in each one of them could be found some reference 
to  truth. If  it be asked, which of the various activities of the 
spirit is real, o r  if they be all real, we must reply that none of 
them is real; because the only reality is the activity of all 
these activities, which does not reside in any one of them in 
particular: of the various syntheses that we have one after 
the other distinguished,-zesthetic synthesis, logical synthe- 
sis, practical synthesis,-the only real one is the synthesis of 
syntheses, the Spirit, which is the true Absolute, the actus 
purus. But from another point of view, and for the same 
reason, all are real, in the unity of the spirit, in the eternal 
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going and coming, which is their eternal constancy and 
reality. Those who see in art  the concept, history, mathe- 
matics, the type, morality, pleasure, and everything else, 
are right, because these and all other things are contained 
within it, owing to the unity of the spirit; indeed, the pres- 
ence in it of them all, and the energetic unilaterality alike 
of ar t  as of any other particular form, tending to reduce all 
activities to one, explains the passage from one form to an- 
other, the completing of one form in the other, and it ex- 
plains development. But those same people are wrong 
(owing to the distinction, which is the inseparable mo- 
ment of unity) in the way that they find them all equally 
abstract o r  equally confused. Because concept, type, num- 
ber, measure, morality, utility, pleasure and pain are in ar t  
as art, either antecedent o r  consequent; and therefore 
are there presupposed (sunk and forgotten there, to adopt 
a favourite expression of De Sanctis) o r  as presentiments. 
Without that presumption, without that presentiment, art  
would not be a r t ;  but it would not be ar t  either (and 
all the other forms of the spirit would be disturbed by i t ) ,  
if it  were desired to impose those values upon art  as art, 
which is and never can be other than pure intuition. T h e  ar- 
tist will always be morally blameless and philosophically un- 
censurable, even though his art  should indicate a low moral- 
ity and philosophy : in so far  as he is an artist, he does not act 
and does not reason, but poetises, paints, sings and, in short, 
expresses himself: were we to adopt a different criterion, we 
should return to the condemnation of Homeric poetry, in the 
manner of the Italian critics of the Seicento and the French 
critics of the time of the fourteenth Louis, who turned up 
their noses at  what they termed “the manners’’ of those in- 
ebriated, vociferating, violent, cruel and ill-educated heroes, 
T h e  criticism of the philosophy underlying Dante’s poem 
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is certainly possible, but that criticism will enter the sub- 
terranean parts of the art  of Dante as though by under- 
mining, and will leave intact the soil on the surface, which 
is the a r t ;  Nicholas Macchiavelli will be able to destroy the 
Dantesque political ideal, recommending neither an emperor 
nor an international pope as greyhound of liberation, but a 
tyrant or  a national prince; but he will not have eradicated 
that aspiration from Dante’s poem. In like manner, it 
may be advisable not to show and not to permit to boys 
and young men the reading of certain pictures, romances, 
and plays; but this recommendation and act of forbidding 
will be limited to the practical sphere and will affect, not 
the works of art, but the books and canvases which serve as 
instruments for  the reproduction of the art, which, as prac- 
tical works, paid for  in the market at a price equivalent 
to so much corn or  gold, can also themselves be shut 
up in a cabinet o r  cupboard, and even be burnt in a “pyre 
of vanities,” 2 la Savonarola. T o  confound the various 
phases of development in an ill-understood impulse for 
unity, to  make morality dominate art, when and so far  as 
art  surpasses morality, o r  ar t  dominate science, when and 
so fa r  as science dominates o r  surpasses art, o r  has already 
been itself dominated and surpassed by life: this is what 
unity well understood, which is also rigorous distinction, 
should prevent and reject. 
And it should prevent and reject it also, because the estab- 
lished order of the various stages of the circle makes it 
possible to understand not only the independence and the 
dependence of the various forms of the spirit, but also 
the preservation of this order of the one in the other, It 
is well to mention one of the problems which present them- 
selves in this place, o r  rather to return to it, for I have 
already referred to it fugitively: the relation between fancy 
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and logic, ar t  and science. This  problem is substantially 
the same as that which reappears as the search for the 
distinction between poetry and prose;  at any rate, since 
(and the discovery was soon made, for it is already found 
in the “Poetic” of Aristotle) it was recognised that the 
distinction cannot be drawn as between. the metrical and 
the unmetrical, since there can be poetry in prose ( fo r  
example, romances and plays) and prose in metre ( fo r  ex- 
ample, didascalic and philosophic poems). W e  shall there- 
fore conduct it with the more profound criterion, which is 
that of image and perception, of intuition and judgment, 
which has already been explained; poetry will be the ex- 
pression of the image, prose that of the judgment o r  concept. 
But the two expressions, in so far as expressions, are of 
the same nature, and both possess the same aesthetic value; 
therefore, if the poet be the lyrist of his feelings, the prosaist 
is also the lyrist of  his feelings,-that is, poet,-though it be 
of the feelings which arise in him from o r  in his search for 
the concept. And there is no reason whatever for recog- 
nising the quality of poet to the composer of a sonnet and of 
refusing it to him who has composed the “Metaphysic,” the 
“Somma Teologia,” the “Scienza Nuova,” the “Phenome- 
nology of the Spirit,” or  told the story of the Pelopon- 
nesian wars, of the politics of Augustus and Tiberius, or 
the “universal history”: in all of those works there is as 
much passion and as much lyrical and representative force 
as in any sonnet or  poem. F o r  all the distinctions with 
which it has been attempted to reserve the poetic quality for  
the poet and to deny it to the prosaist, are like those stones, 
carried with great effort to the top of a steep mountain, which 
fall back again into the valley with ruinous results. Yet 
there is a just apparent difference, but in order to determine 
it, poetry and prose must not be separated in the manner of 
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naturalistic logic, like two co-ordinated concepts simply op- 
posed the one to the other: we must conceive them in devel- 
opment as a passage from poetry to prose. And since the 
poet, in this passage, not only presupposes a passionate ma- 
terial, owing to the unity of the spirit, but preserves the 
passionality and elevates it to the passionality of a poet 
(passion for a r t ) ,  so the thinker or  prosaist not only pre- 
serves that passionality and elevates it to a passionality for 
science, but also preserves the intuitive force, owing to which 
his judgments come forth expressed together with the pas- 
sionality that surrounds them, and therefore they retain their 
artistic as well as their scientific character. W e  can always 
contemplatc this artistic character, assuming its scientific 
character, or  separating it therefrom and from the criticism 
of science, in order to enjoy the asthetic form which it has 
assumed; and this is also the reason why science belongs, 
though in different aspects, to the history of science and to 
the history of literature, and why, among the many different 
kinds of poetry enumerated by the rhetoricians, it would at 
the least be capricious to refuse to number the “poetry of 
prose,” which is sometimes far  purer poetry than much pre- 
tentious poetry of poetry. And it will be well that I should 
mention again a new problem of the same sort, to which I 
have already alluded in passing : namely, the connection be- 
tween ar t  and morality, which has been denied to be imme- 
diate identification of the one with the other, but which must 
now be reasserted, and to note that, since the poet preserves 
the passion for his ar t  when free from every other passion- 
ality, so he preserves in his art the consciousness of duty 
(duty toward a r t ) ,  and every poet, in the act of creation, 
is moral, because he accomplishes a sacred function. 
And finally, the order and logic of the various forms 
of the spirit, making the one necessary for the other and 
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therefore all necessary, reveal the folly of negating the 
one in the name of the other:  the error of the philoso- 
pher (P la to) ,  or of the moralist (Savonarola or Proud- 
hon),  o r  of the naturalist and practical man (there are 
so many of these that I do not quote names!), who refute 
ar t  and poetry; and, on the other hand, the error of the 
artist who rebels against thought, science, practice, and 
morality, as did so many “romantics” in tragedy, and as do 
so many “decadents’) in comedy in our day. These are er- 
rors and follies to  which also we can afford a caress in pass- 
ing (always keeping in view our plan of not leaving anyone 
quite disconsolate), for it is evident that they have a posi- 
tive content of their own in their very negativity, as rebellion 
against certain false concepts o r  certain false manifestations 
of art  and of science, of practice and of morality (Plato, for  
example, combating the idea of poetry as “wisdom” ; Savo- 
narola, the not austere and therefore corrupt civilisation of 
the Italian Renaissance so soon to be dissolved), etc. But 
it is madness to  attempt to prove that were philosophy 
without art, it would exist for  itself, because it would be 
without what conditions its problems, and air to  breathe 
would be taken from it, in order to make it prevail alone 
against a r t ;  and that practice is not practice, when it is not 
set in motion and revived by aspirations, and, as they say, 
by “ideals,)’ by “dear imagining,” which is a r t ;  and, on the 
other hand, that art  without morality, art  that usurps with 
the decadents the title of “pure beauty,’’ and before which 
is burnt incense, as though it were a diabolic idol worshipped 
by a company of devils, owing to the lack of morality in the 
life from which it springs and which surrounds it, is decom- 
posed as art, and become caprice, luxury, and charlatanry; 
the artist no longer serves it, but it serves the private and 
futile interests of the artist as the vilest of slaves. 
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Nevertheless, objection has been taken to the idea of the 
circle in general, which affords so much aid in making clear 
the connection of dependence and independence of art  and 
of the other spiritual forms, on the ground that it thinks the 
work of the spirit as a tiresome and melancholy doing and 
undoing, a monotonous turning upon itself, not worth the 
trouble of effecting. Certainly there is no metaphor but 
leaves some side open to parody and caricature; but these, 
when they have gladdened us for the moment, oblige us to 
return seriously to the thought expressed in the metaphor. 
And the thought is not that of a sterile repetition of going 
and coming, but a continuous enrichment in the going of the 
going and the coming of the coming. T h e  last term, which 
again becomes the first, is not the old first, but presents itself 
with a multiplicity and precision of concepts, with an experi- 
ence of life lived, and even of works contemplated, which 
was wanting to the old first term; and it affords material for  
a more lofty, more refined, more complex and more mature 
art. Thus, instead of being a perpetually even revolution, 
the idea of the circle is nothing but the true philosophical 
idea of progress, of the perpetual growth of the spirit and 
of reality in itself, where nothing is repeated, save the form 
of the growth; unless it should be objected to a man walk- 
ing, that his walking is a standing still, because he always 
moves his legs in the same time! 
Another objection, or  rather another movement of rebel- 
lion against the same idea, is frequently to be observed, 
though not clearly self-conscious : the restlessness, existing 
in some o r  several, the endeavour to break and to surpass 
the circularity that is a law of life, and to attain to a region 
of repose from movement, so full of anxiety; withdrawn 
henceforward from the ocean and standing upon the shore, 
to turn back and contemplate the tossing billows. But I have 
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already had occasion to state of what this repose consists: 
an effectual negation of reality, beneath the appearance of 
elevation and sublimation; and it is certainly attained, but is 
called death; the death of the individual, not of reality, 
which does not die, and is not afflicted by its own motion, but 
enjoys it. Others dream of a spiritual form, in which the 
circle is dissolved, a form which should be Thought of 
thought, unity of the Theoretical and of the Practical, Love, 
God, or  whatever other name it may bear;  they fail to per- 
ceive that this thought, this unity, this Love, this God, al- 
ready exists in and for  the circle, and  that they are uselessly 
repeating a search already completed, o r  are repeating 
metaphorically what has already been discovered, in the 
myth of another world, where the very drama of the only 
world should be repeated. 
I have hitherto outlined this drama, as it truly is, ideal 
and extratemporal, employing such terms as first and second, 
solely with a view to verbal convenience and in order to 
indicate logical order :-ideal and extratemporal, because 
there is not a moment and there is not an individual in whom 
it is not all performed, as there is no particle of the uni- 
verse unbreathed upon by the Spirit of God. But the ideal, 
indivisible moments of the ideal drama can be seen as i f  
divided in empirical reality, like an impure and embodied 
symbol of the ideal distinction. Not  that they are really 
divided (ideality is the true reality), but they appear to be 
so empirically to him who looks upon them with a view to 
classification, for  he possesses no other way of determining 
in the types the individuality of the facts that have attracted 
his attention, save that of enlarging and of exaggerating 
ideal distinctions. Thus the artist, the philosopher, the his- 
torian, the naturalist, the mathematician, the man of busi- 
ness, the good man, seem to live separated from one 
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another; and the spheres of artistic, philosophical, his- 
torical, naturalistic, mathematical culture, and those of eco- 
nomic and ethic and of the many institutions connected with 
them, to be distinct from one another; and finally, the life 
of humanity is divided into epochs in the ages, in which 
one o r  the other o r  only some of the ideal forms are repre- 
sented: epochs of fancy, of religion, of speculation, of natu- 
ral sciences, of industrialism, of political passions, of moral 
enthusiasms, of pleasure seeking, and so on;  and these 
epochs have their more or  less perfect goings and comings. 
But the eye of the historian discovers the perpetual differ- 
ence in the uniformity of individuals, of classes, and of 
epochs; and the philosophical consciousness, unity in differ- 
ence ; and the philosopher-historian sees ideal progress and 
unity, as also historical progress, in that difference. 
But let us, too, speak as empiricists for a moment (so 
that since empiricism exists it may be of some use),  and let 
us ask ourselves to which of the specimens belongs our epoch, 
or  that from which we have just emerged; what is its pre- 
vailing characteristic? T o  this there will be an immediate 
and universal reply that it is and has been naturalistic in 
culture, industrial in practice ; and philosophical greatness 
and artistic greatness will a t  the same time both be denied to 
it. But since (and here empiricism is already in danger) no 
epoch can live without philosophy and without art, our 
epoch, too, has possessed both, so far  as it was capable of 
possessing them. And its philosophy and its art-the for- 
mer mediately, the latter immediately-find their places in 
thought, as documents of what our epoch has truly been in 
its complexity and interests ; by interpreting these, we shall 
be able to  clear the ground upon which must arise our duty. 
Contemporary art, sensual, insatiable in its desire for en- 
joyments, furrowed with turbid attempts a t  an ill-un- 
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derstood aristocracy, which reveals itself as a voluptuous 
ideal or  an ideal of arrogance and of cruelty, sometimes 
sighing for a mysticism which is also egoistic and volup- 
tuous, without faith in God and without faith in thought, 
incredulous and pessimistic,-and often very powerful in its 
rendering of such states of the soul: this art,-vainly con- 
demned by moralists,-when understood in its profound 
motives and in its genesis, asks for action, which will cer- 
tainly not be directed toward condemning, repressing, or  
rearranging art, but toward directing life more energetically 
toward a more healthy and more profound morality, which 
will be mother of a nobler art, and, I would also say, of a 
nobler philosophy. A more noble philosophy than that of 
our epoch, incapable of accounting not only for  religion, for 
science, and for itself, but for ar t  itself, which has again 
become a profound mystery, o r  rather a theme for hor- 
rible blunders by positivists, neocriticists, psychologists, and 
pragmatists, who have hitherto represented contemporary 
philosophy, and have relapsed (perhaps in order to  acquire 
new strength and to mature new problems!) into the most 
childish and most crude conceptions of art. 
